Volume 35
Issue 1 Winter 1995
Winter 1995

Is Habitat Modification that Kills or Injures Endangered Wildlife a
Prohibited Taking under the Endagered Species Act
Nancy Greif

Recommended Citation
Nancy Greif, Is Habitat Modification that Kills or Injures Endangered Wildlife a Prohibited Taking under the
Endagered Species Act, 35 Nat. Resources J. 189 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol35/iss1/8

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu,
sarahrk@unm.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Is Habitat Modification that Kills or
Injures Endangered Wildlife a
Prohibited Taking Under the
Endangered Species Act?
In the spring of 1994, one judge met his conscience on a single
issue: Does habitat modification rise to the level of an impermissible
"taking" of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act
("Act" or "ESA")?1 When that judge altered his position, on a motion for
rehearing and without additional oral argument, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed its earlier
opinion! By a vote of two to one the Court held invalid a Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") regulation that defines "harm" in the definition
of "to take" under the ESA as:
an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation where
it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
3
sheltering.
The court invalidated the regulation because it was neither clearly
4
authorized by Congress nor a "reasonable interpretation" of the statute.
Not only did this decision reverse an earlier decision by the same court,5
it also created a conflict with the Ninth Circuit on this issue.6 In the Palila
decisions the Ninth Circuit found that the regulation followed the plain
language of the ESA and was consistent with the policy of Congress as
evidenced by the legislative history.7 The Supreme Court has granted

1. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C.

§ 1531-1544

(1988)).
2. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt ("Sweet Home III"),
17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), modifying per curiam 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam),
reh'gand reh'g en banc denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
3. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991).
4. See generally Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d 1463.
5. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt ("Sweet Home
II"), 1 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 was valid).
6. Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources ("Palila W"), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that actions that modified the habitat of an endangered bird (the palila)
in a way that could lead to extinction constituted "harm" under the ESA and therefore
amounted to a prohibited taking).
7. Id. at 1108.
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certiorari to the Sweet Home cases and will soon resolve the conflict
between the circuits by ruling on the validity of the regulation.
This note examines the jurisprudence expressed on this issue in
both the Sweet Home and Palila decisions. The conclusion is that the
Supreme Court should reverse the Sweet Home III decision and affirm the
Department of the Interior's regulation.
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS
In the Sweet Home decisions, parties who were dependent on the
forest products industry sued the Secretary of the Interior and the
Director of the FWS claiming that their livelihoods had been damaged by
timber harvest restrictions designed to protect the habitat of the northern
spotted owl.' Three issues were raised by this line of cases. Only the
third issue, the scope and validity of Interior's harm regulation, will be
discussed here.
In Sweet Home I, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the harm regulation promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior was valid and did not violate the ESA."0 The court, in a
carefully reasoned opinion by Judge Johnson, found that the language,
structure, and legislative history of the ESA reveal that Congress intended
an expansive definition of the word "take" which would encompass
habitat modification. Judge Johnson analyzed the validity of the
regulation under the standards of statutory review established by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc." Under the Chevron test, if the "intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter," and the federal agency's regulatory interpretation
If the intent of Congress is ambiguous,
must fulfill this intent."
however, the court must decide if the agency's regulation is "based on a
its
permissible construction of the statute."3 A court may not substitute
4
own interpretation if the agency's interpretation is "reasonable.0
Several congressional reports discuss the intent of Congress in
using the word "take." The definition of "take" was to be interpreted "in
the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which

8. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 714

(1995).
9. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan ("Sweet Home r'),
806 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D.D.C. 1992).
10. Id. at 285.

11. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12. Id. at 842-43.
13. Id. at 843.
14. Id. at 844.
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a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."' Judge
Johnson found that the intent of Congress was clear and quoted a
congressional report saying that "[o]ften habitat protection is the only
means of protecting endangered animals which occur on non-public
lands."16 Under Chevron, because the intent of Congress was clear, that
was the end of the matter and the regulation was valid.
In Sweet Home II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the holding that the regulation was valid in
a two to one decision." All three judges on the panel deciding the case
wrote separate opinions that cover the issue of whether habitat modification may rise to the level of a prohibited taking. Chief Judge Mikva
affirmed the deferential Chevron standard used by Judge Johnson of the
District Court and concluded that Congress intended to include habitat
modification as a prohibited action under the ESA. To support this
position the Judge marshaled considerable evidence and precedent. For
example, Judge Mikva quoted the Supreme Court's observation that:
In shaping [the ESA], Congress started from the finding that
"It]he two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of natural habitat." S. Rep. No. 93-307, p. 2 (1973). Of
these twin threats, Congress was informed that the greatest
8
was destruction of natural habitats .... ."1
He also pointed out that the first stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved. . . .""1
Judge Mikva argued
that the regulation sets up permissible standards by which to judge when
a habitat modification is so drastic that it constitutes a taking, and he
pointed out that even if the definition of harm were to be found invalid,
the unchallenged definition of "to harass" is probably broad enough to
prohibit significant habitat modification."
Judge Mikva's final major argument was that even if the
language and history of the ESA were found to be ambiguous as to
whether Congress intended to forbid habitat modification, a critical piece
of evidence indicates their actual intent. In 1982, Congress amended the

15. S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1973). See also H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11, 15 (1973).
16. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284 (quoting S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1973)).
17. Sweet Home I, 1 F.3d at 3.
18. Id. at 8 (Mikva, C.J., concurring) (quoting Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 179 (1978)).
19. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
20. Id. at 10 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
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ESA to include a provision that authorizes limited takings, pursuant to
a permit, incident to "an otherwise lawful activity."2' By modifying the
law to allow the FWS to permit incidental takings, Congress confirmed
that without such a permit incidental takings were unlawful. The
legislative history dearly shows that habitat modification is a kind of
activity that required a permit, because the House Report states that the
incidental takings amendment is "modeled after a habitat conservation
plan that has been developed by three Northern California cities.... .2
In conclusion, Judge Mikva noted that, in upholding the regulation, the
D.C. Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in finding that inclusion of habitat
destruction in the definition of harm is a reasonable and permissible
regulation implementing the ESAP
In a short concurring opinion, Judge Williams found the
regulation valid solely because of the inference derived from the 1982
amendments to the ESA with respect to incidental takings permits.24
Otherwise, Judge Williams found the dissent's analysis persuasive.
In dissent, Judge Sentelle voted to invalidate the regulation even
though he ostensibly applied the same Chevron standard of deference that
Judges Mikva and Johnson used to uphold the regulation. Judge
Sentelle's principal problem with the regulation stemmed from the fact
that he had "seen a great many farmers modifying habitat... [and] at no
point when I have seen a farmer so engaged has it occurred to me that
he is taking game." On a profound level, Judge Sentelle voiced a
legitimate concern. Apparently he was concerned that if the regulation
was allowed to stand, the "habitat police" will swoop down on well
meaning citizens and prohibit them from engaging in any livelihood
which alters the landscape. The above quote is as close as Judge Sentelle
gets to voicing his underlying policy concerns. The rest of the dissent is
spent cloaking his real concerns in a veneer composed of the canons of
statutory construction.
Judge Sentelle's principal structural argument was that a word is
known by the company it keeps, noscitur a sociis. The company the word
"harm" keeps in the law is bad company indeed. Most of the words that
codify section 9 of the Act are very specific and suggest a direct injury to
endangered wildlife: hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, collect.?

21. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)).
22. Id. at 11 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-835,97th Cong. 2d Sess. 30-31 (1982), U.S.C.C.A.N.
2807, 2871, 2872 (1982)).
23. Id. (citing Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources ("Palila IV"), 852 F.2d

1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988)).
24. Id. (Williams, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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Only pursue and harass are somewhat milder and would not necessarily
result in the death or injury of wildlife. Judge Sentelle reasoned that in
such violent statutory company, surely Congress meant that harm is
prohibited only if it harms to the same degree as these other resolutely
active verbs. However, Judge Sentelle chose not to discuss the company
of the less violent "pursue" or the word "harass" which seems as broad
an activity as "harm." The noscitur a sociis argument fails because not all
of the listed prohibited actions are forceful; harm keeps company with
both violent and nonviolent actions.
The final canon of statutory construction that Judge Sentelle used
to invalidate the regulation was the presumption against surplusage from
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc." The judge's concern
was that the agency's interpretation of the word harm, as an "act which
actually kills or injures wildlife,"' encompasses all the other verbs in
that section, such as hunt, shoot, and kill, rendering those verbs
superfluous.' Congress would have wasted the ink on all these other
verbs if they could legitimately all be subsumed under the definition of
a single word, harm. However, the judge did not follow this argument
to its logical conclusion. Congress did include both "harm" and the other
forceful words which may be encompassed by "harm." Thus, the
congressional authors of this language indicated that the meaning of
harm was intended to include the less violent meanings of harm, such as
impairment of feeding, sheltering, and breeding by habitat modification.
Otherwise, Congress would have had no reason to include the word
"harm," whose more violent meanings are listed individually.
Judge Sentelle could have written a more forthright dissent based
on his underlying policy concerns, but he did not. In Sweet Home III,
however, Judge Williams echoed and carried forward Judge Sentelle's
concerns about the farmer tilling his field." In Sweet Home II, Judge
Williams stated that the regulation was valid because the inference of the
1982 Amendments was that Congress recognized "that the ESA otherwise
forbids some such incidental takings, including some habitat modification.""' In Sweet Home III, Judge Williams reversed that position, joined
Judge Sentelle, and wrote for the new two to one majority to invalidate
the regulation.

27. 486 U.S. 825 (1988). The rule of construction, as expressed in this case, is that courts
should be reluctant to affirm an agency interpretation of a law that would render
superfluous another part of that law. Id. at 837.
28. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991).
29. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
30. See generally Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1464-72.
31. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 1I (Williams, J., concurring).
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Like Judge Sentelle in Sweet Home II, Judge Williams appears to
have made a decision based on policy grounds and then clothed it in the
arguments of statutory construction. Judge Sentelle was worried that the
farmer plowing his field might be guilty of a prohibited taking if he was
found to have significantly modified endangered species habitat. Judge
Williams may have been worried that every time that farmer wanted to
plow he would have to get an incidental takings permit. That may be a
legitimate policy concern, but again, like Judge Sentelle, Judge Williams
did not argue the underlying policy issues. Instead, he too fell back upon
canons of statutory construction.
He repeated the noscitur a sociis argument and noted that the
other forceful words listed as constituting a taking argued against a
broad reading of harm.32 As discussed above, at least three of the words,
harm, pursue and harass, do not necessarily involve the application of
force. The noscitur a sociis line of reasoning is strongest when all the
words in the list are similar except for one ambiguous word. That is not
the case with the definition of "to take" in the Act: some words are
"forceful," some are not. If any of the judges had employed the plain
meaning test it would have reinforced this conclusion. A harm may be
"an act or instance of injury,' 33 i.e., harm may be intentional or coincidental.
Judge Williams then outlined a detailed example of a situation in
which a utility company sought to construct a nuclear power plant on the
Connecticut River.' In supporting the 1982 amendments authorizing
the FWS to issue incidental takings permits, an expert witness explained
that endangered sturgeon eggs were inevitably entrained and crushed by
the intake valves. Without the amendment the FWS could effectively
prohibit the plant because the taking of the eggs was prohibited. Thus,
said Judge Williams, the incidental takings permit system arose from two
assumptions: "1)that the perpetrator need not have intended to take the
creature in question, and 2) that even the slightest taking would violate
the Act. . . ." This anecdote seems to be the basis for Judge Williams'
underlying concern that even minor modifications of habitat would
require a bureaucratic incidental takings permit under the FWS regulation.
Judge Mikva, now writing in dissent in Sweet Home III, pointed
out that the majority granted rehearing without oral argument or
additional briefs tailored to the court's concerns. He stated, "What was
rightly considered good law in the opinion in this case issued last year
32.
33.
34.
35.

Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1464-66.
Webster's Third International Dictionary, Unabridged (1971).
Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1467-68.
Id. at 1468 (emphasis in original).
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...
is now 'altered' on the basis of a confusing and misguided legal
analysis that creates a needless conflict among the circuits." He then
examined the majority's arguments and concluded that they found
nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history that unambiguously shows that "harm" may not encompass habitat modification.3 7
Thus, under Chevron, the regulation must be upheld because, even if the
intent of Congress was ambiguous, the agency's regulation was reasonable.
Judge Mikva pointed out that the Ninth Circuit held that the FWS
definition of "harm" was a permissible interpretation of the statute and
was, therefore, valid. That holding is in conflict with the holding in Sweet
Home III. The Ninth Circuit opinion is found in a sequence of four
decisions between 1979 and 1988 involving the Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources' maintenance of herds of feral sheep, feral
goats, and imported mouflon sheep for sport hunting purposes in an area
high on the slopes of Mauna Kea. The area had been designated critical
habitat for the endangered bird known as the palila. The sheep and goats
caused significant habitat modification and degradation of the mamanenaio forest on which the palila depends for its survival. In the Palila
cases,' the courts found that the Department's practice of maintaining
sheep and goats in the palila's critical habitat in an area owned by the
state of Hawaii constituted an unlawful "taking" under the ESA and the
Department was ordered to remove the sheep and goats from the area.
The regulation itself was not challenged but its application, i.e.,
court-ordered removal of the animals to prevent impermissible habitat
modification, was challenged. In no case did the actions of the Department directly affect the birds. They did not harass, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect the birds. Rather, their maintenance
of the sheep and goats destroyed the palila's critical habitat and in Palila
I, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding
that the defendants were in violation of the prohibition against taking
endangered species because they were harming the birds by a policy that
led to the destruction of critical habitat.N

36. Id. at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 1473-78.
38. Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources ("Palila r"), 471 F. Supp. 985 (D.
Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Palila Ir'). Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and
Natural Resources ("Palila lII"), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("Palla IV").
39. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 995, 999.
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The defendants appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 4 Even
though the exact definition of harm was changed in 1981,41 the Palila II
court found that the definition then, as now, included activity that results
in significant environmental modification or degradation of the endangered animals habitat.'
In Palila III, the plaintiffs sued in U.S. District Court to remove
the mouflon sheep as well as the feral sheep and goats from palila's
critical habitat. This issue had been held in abeyance because studies
were in progress to determine whether the mouflon sheep destroyed the
habitat in the same way as did the feral animals. The most significant
part of this opinion is the judge's finding that:
A finding of "harm" does not require death to individual
members of the species; nor does it require a finding that
habitat degradation is presently driving the species further
toward extinction. Habitat destruction that prevents the
recovery of the species by affecting essential behavioral
patterns causes actual injury to the species and effects a taking
under section 9 of the Act.3
As support for this position Judge King noted that, in 1981, the
Secretary of the Interior redefined "harm" in the regulations because he
was concerned that the original definition could lead to any habitat
modification being a per se violation. Thus, he proposed that harm be
simply defined as "an act which injures or kills wildlife."44 After the
comment period, however, the Secretary decided not to require actual
death but redefined "harm:"
to mean any action, including habitat modification, which
actually kills or injures wildlife, rather than the present
interpretation which might be read to include habitat modification or degradation alone without further proof of death or
injury. Habitat modification as injury would only be covered
by the new definition if it significantly impaired essential
behavioral patterns of a listed species.'
The judge quoted from the same section of the final rule, noting that the
redefinition of harm was not limited to:

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Palila II, 639 F.2d at 498.
PalitaIII, 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
PallaII, 639 F.2d at 497-98.
Palila IfI, 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
Id. at 1076 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,490 (1981)).
Id. at 1077 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,748 (1981)).
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direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife
species... The purpose of the redefinition was to preclude
claims of a Section 9 taking for habitat modification alone
without any attendant death or injury of the protected wildlife.
Death or injury, however, may be caused by impairment of
essential behavioral patterns which can have significant and
permanent effects on a listed species.*
The key is the link between habitat modification and harm to the
species as a whole, i.e., by preventing or inhibiting recovery of the
population. Judge King found that the presence of the exotic sheep had a
negative impact on the palila population that threatened the continued
existence and recovery of the species. "Once this determination has been
made, the [ESA] leaves no room for balancing policy considerations ...

.I A taking had occurred and the sheep had to be removed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed PalitaIII because the district court's finding that
habitat modification that could result in extinction constitutes "harm" was
not clearly erroneous.'
CONCLUSION
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court should reverse
the Sweet Home III decision. First, the Sweet Home III court's deepest policy
concerns were misplaced and led to faulty jurisprudence. In both the Palila
and Sweet Home lines of cases it was a concern that any habitat modification
per se not be a taking in violation of section 9. In Sweet Home III, Judges
Williams and Sentelle worried about the possibility that under the existing
wording any modification of habitat would be a prohibited taking and a
violation of the law. The Department of the Interior's clarification in the
publication of the final rule, quoted by Judge King in Palila III, should
reassure the D.C. Circuit that such is not the case. A careful reading of the
harm regulation supports this conclusion. It states that significant habitat
modification is only a taking when it "actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering."' In other words, the burden of proof is on the
person alleging harm to prove either actual death or injury by impairment
of essential functions. Clearly, habitat modification per se would not be a
violation. Sweet Home III was wrongly decided because the court ignored

46. Id. (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. at 54,748)
47. Palla 11, 649 F. Supp. at 1082.

48. Palila IV, 852 F.2d at 1110.
49. Palila III, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.

50. 50 C.F.R. 17.3 (1991).
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the need for proof of injury by impairment and simply struck down the
regulation in toto because they believed that habitat modification per se
should not constitute a violation. Sweet Home III should be reversed because
the regulation does not make modification a per se violation but requires
sophisticated but ascertainable proof of impairment.
In addition, Sweet Home III should be reversed because if it is
allowed to stand, habitat modification which impairs essential activities of
endangered species will no longer require an incidental takings permit.
There will no longer be a need to show that mitigation measures have been
considered and adopted. This is clearly contrary to the intent of the original
1973 legislation and the 1982 Amendments. As Judge Mikva stated in his
Sweet Home III dissent, "The purpose of the Endangered Species Act, lest we
forget, is to protect endangered species."' The incidental takings permit
provision is designed to allow developers and others the needed flexibility
to modify habitat as long as it does not tip a species into extinction. That
should not be too onerous a burden. If the burden is removed, then persons
could modify or destroy habitat to their hearts' content as long as no actual
dead or injured creatures were found.
Third, it is not logical to believe that the Congress intended a strict
standard that prohibits habitat modification which leads to species
impairment or death for federal actions (section 7) and a more lenient
standard which allows similar modifications in non-federal actions (section
9 as reinterpreted by the Sweet Home III court).
Fourth, the Sweet Home III court jettisons the Chevron standard
impermissibly. While the challenged regulation is a reasonable one it is not
the only possible interpretation of the statute. The Sweet Home III court
impermissibly substitutes their preferred interpretation of the statute for a
reasonable agency interpretation which should have been accorded due
deference. 2
In summary, when Judge Williams shifted his support to Judge
Sentelle's position, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit voted two
to one to invalidate the Department of the Interior's regulation that defines
a harm to include significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing behavioral
patterns. This decision is in conflict with Ninth Circuit decisions that hold

51. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1478 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
52. The entire issue may be moot because even without validation of a definition of harm
which includes significant habitat modification, the Interior may simply subsume habitat

modification under its unchallenged definition of "harass." Harassment includes any activity,
whether an intentional or negligent act or omission, which creates the likelihood of injury
to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral
patterns which include, but are not limited to breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 50 C.F.R. §

17.3 (1991).
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that habitat modification, which could lead to species extinction, constitutes
an impermissible taking under the Endangered Species Act. The Supreme
Court should reverse the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and reaffirm
the principals articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Dr. Nancy Greif

